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1. Introduction
      It is often observed that a firm exhibits particular organizational ways of common thinking and 
working. Such shared norms and value judgements are, as a whole, called corporate (organizational) 
culture. It provides the members with decision criteria nd guidelines to resolve conflicts.' We can find 
such a "culture" not only in the organization ofa firm but also in the relationships between amanufacturer 
and its distribution channel of dealers. Makers and their channels like those in the automobile industry 
have specific assets accumulated through fi-equent and continuing transactions between themselves. They 
also generate some kind of "culture" as an important complement to incomplete written contracts to 
preserve the value of specific assets against contingencies. 
      In this paper we examine competingdistribution channels, in each of which, efforts by dealers are 
unverifiable though observable by the manufacturer, and the members ina channel can not make contracts 
with respect to effort levels. We introduce a Bergson-Samuelson welfare function for the dealers as a 
means to supplement this incompleteness.' That is, dealers are assumed to expect hat he maker will 
divide the rewards to maximize the welfare function. Such a welfare function could be seen as a kind of 
corporate culture that possibly is generated over a long time.' When two channels are associated with
` For the research on corporate culture in the field of organization theory
, see Deal and Kennedy (1982), 
Peters and Waterman (1982), Schein (1.985), Nonaka (1985), Schneider (1990), Denison (1990), and 
Kotter and Heskett (1992). These authors emphasize the importance ofculture as a norm to induce 
practical implications, but their arguments are not always clear about which elements of culture affect 
an organization's performance. On the other hand, Kreps (1992) treats corporate culture as a game-
theoretic equilibrium in behavioral patterns of interdependent individuals. It is questionable, however, 
whether the usual equilibrium strategies can cover the concept for which the word "corporate culture" 
is used. 
2 Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) consider ex post negotiations to divide 
common profits as a complement tothe incompleteness of written contracts. 
3 Aoki and Okuno (1996, Ch. 1.2. l) mention an idea similar to ours, that a "culture" can be treated as a 
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different cultures, or different welfare functions, the dealers in each group have different expectations about 
the distribution of rewards. Ray and. Ueda (1996) consider amodel of a group with a welfare function for 
the members, and find that he group shows the better performance when it has a more egalitarian welfare 
function. Bearing distribution channels in mind, we will analyze asimple model of groups with welfare 
functions competing for market shares and show that he group associated with the more egalitarian welfare 
function obtains the larger share. This conclusion implies that he finding of Ray and Ueda is robust in the 
case of several groups competing for market shares. 
      But the main message of this modelisthat he degree of egalitarianism can be an important 
criterion to classify corporate cultures. Taking the case of the channels of two major Japanese automobile 
manufacturers ( Toyota and Nissan ), we will examine the adequacy ofthis argument and derive positive 
observations. The existing studies of corporate culture do not necessarily make clear what aspect of it 
affect he performance of an organization. i  a competitive context. Our argument provides anew insight 
to clarify the relationship between the performance of a competing organization a d its culture. 
      In the next section, amodel of competing channels for market share is introduced to formally 
analyze the relationships between corporate culture and market share. Section 3 is devoted to a case study 
of the distribution channels of Toyota and Nissan in Japan. The differences between the two channels in 
culture and sharing rule are outlined, with a brief history of the construction ofthe channels, and the 
relation between these differences and market share is examined. Section 4 gives a summary and 
conclusions.
2. A model of competing channels for market share
2-1 Assumptions and notations
value judgement represented byasocial welfare function. They also argue that it should be 
distinguished from an "institution," which is an equilibrium pattern of behaviors. 
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      Consider in distribution channels in a market. The ith. channel consists of n; dealers providing the 
product of the ith maker. The effort level of the jth dealer in the ith channel is denoted by xU, and the sum 
of the effort in the ith channel is denoted by X;. We assume that he share of the ith channel S; is given by 
the ratio of X; to the total effort of the all channels, X. That is, 
                       yn;                                                              XU..                              _X j=l
                                          h=1X17
        ur main concern is how different cultures in the ways to treat dealers show different economic O 
performance. To consider this question as simply as possible, we will not discuss the division of profit 
between a maker and its dealer explicitly. Instead, it is assumed that the total rewards for the dealers in a 
distribution channel would be increasing with respect o market share in a relevant range of effort levels.' 
The simplest representation of this is using the share of the ith channel S; itself as a proxy of the total 
rewards for the channel. Henceforward, we will adopt this assumption. Let us specify the utility of the 
jth dealer of the ith channel, u1, as follows: 
                             U11,= log Y4 - xv. , (2)
where y;; is the rewards distributed to the dealer. 
The ith channel is associated with a Bergson-Samuelson welfare function 
     YV. _ -•(~n`                   J,[expa(-; •u j)-I a; >0   ail) (3)
The maker using the ith channel and the dealers hare the value judgement that he rewards for the channel 
should be shared to maximize this welfare function. In this sense, this welfare function represents a kind 
of "channel culture". The parameter a;can be seen as the "degree of egalitarianism" in the sense that he 
4 We present abrief discussion of the adequacy of this presumption i  Section 4. 
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welfare function with the higher value of this parameter p efers to decrease the differences ofutility levels 
among members.' The following geometric argument may help to understand the intuitive meaning. 
Figure 1 shows an iso-welfare curve for two dealers of the ith channel, given other dealers' utility levels. 
The curvature of this function rises as the value of a; goes up. Thus, the welfare function with a higher 
value of ci, permits alower utility level for both dealers to reduce the difference of these values. When a; 
goes up to infinity, the welfare function converges tothe "Rawlsian" welfare function, and the welfare level 
of the channel depends only on the lowest value of utility among members. On the other hand, when a; 
converges to 0, the welfare function converges to the "utilitarian" welfare function. Only the sum of 
utilities of the dealers matters, and the distribution between them is ignored. 
      Given. the values of in, n„ and a; (i=1, .._ m), we will consider the game of competing channels in 
which every dealer determines the effort level simultaneously to maximize utility. To choose the effort 
level, a dealer belonging to a distribution channel uses the knowledge that he maker employing the channel 
will distribute the rewards to maximize the associated welfare function to the maker and. the channel. 
Then each channel's market share and each dealer's utility are given as a Nash equilibrium. 
2-2 Distribution within a channel 
      To derive a Nash equilibrium, we need to know what distribution rule a channel takes. Consider 
the ith channel. Given the rewards or the share S,, it is divided to maximize the associated welfare 
function. By using (2) and (3), the sharing rule is determined tosolve 
                         -; Yl;       MaoxW,. _ . nl exp - a; • logY;~ - x;j+- s.ty y n;                                                         ~_1 y = 5; . (4)          y.; - a;1 a;
Then the first-order condition implies
    exp la; •x;~ 
YO - +a; 
          A 1+a;
5 For a formal definition of the degeree of egalitarianism in this sense, see Ray and Ueda (1996). 
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where 2, is the Lagrangean multiplier. By using L.~' 1 yu = S; and denoting b;=a;/(l+a;), we have the 
following derived sharing rule; 
                            exp b, x, 
                             y= n; •S;. (5) 
                           1h=1 exp bhx~h 
As h; is a strictly increasing function of a;, b; is also the parameter ofthe degree of egalitarianism. Notice 
that a rise of b;; or the degree of egalitarianism, akes the marginal reward for effort go up. 
2-3 Equilibrium effort levels 
      .In a Nash equilibrium, each dealer chooses effort o maximize utility, given the sharing rule of the 
channel and all other dealers' effort levels. As S; is given by (1), the jth dealer belonging to the ith channel 
solves the maximization problem 
                         I exp blx~ xih 
                   Max u;J = log ~~ (6)                     xj'O ~h,1eXpbixih X 
in an equilibrium. By using the first-order condition 
                                       expb.x.. X - X.                      bj- I- Y,
h=1 bixih X • X i 
we can confirm that every dealer in the ith channel chooses the same effort level. Thus, the first-order 
condition can be written as 
                      X; = X (7) 
                                          n; 
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I In a pure Nash equilibrium, this condition must hold in every channel. Summing up these quations, we 
have a necessary condition of an equilibrium 
                                                 »7 1
                                              =1, (8) 
                         1+ 1-b1(1--1) • 
X 
                                        ni 
which gives the equilibrium total effort level. Then we can calculate ach channel's equilibrium effort 
level by using this equation and equation (7). 
2-4 Comparative statics 
      Equations(7) and (8) imply several interesting results in comparative statics. 
. Proposition 1 Denote X ,=X-X;. Then ax >0, i, e., effort levels of channels are strategic 
                               ax _; 
complements of each other.' 
Proof. Differentiate both sides of equation (7) by X,. As ax =1+ ax' , we have 
                                            ax_; ax _, 
                    ax; _ 1 
               ax_; 1+(1-b;(1- Yn,))X -1 
                                                                       Q.E.D. 
T Proposition 2 ax > 0 and > 0, i, e., a rise of* egalitarianism in a channel raises the total effort          b
, ab; 
level as well as its own effort level. 
6 Ueda (1997) considers a collective rent-seeking ame in which each group's haring is derived from 
the associated welfare function. In his model, the effort levels of competing groups are strategic 
substitutes in the neighborhood f equilibrium. 
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Proof. Use equation (8) to derive 
                     1-bk(1-1) (1- 1)-X 
             ax »> nk _            ~ n; 
                 ab L.Jk-, 2 - 2 , 
                    l+ 1-bk(1--) •X 1+ 1-b;(1-1) X 
                                    nk n
, 
which implies that X is strictly increasing with respect o b;. But equation (7) implies 
                                          (1--1).X2             ax. - 1 ax n; 
          ah; 1 2 ab; + 1 2 ' 
               1+(1-b;(1--))X 1+(1-b;(1--))X 
                                 n; ni 
and this equation proves the proposition. Q.E.D. 
 We can see that a rise of egalitarianism in one channel raises every channel's effort level, by using 
Proposition 1 and 2. Although higher egalitarianism in achannel induces higher effort from members, it 
also makes all rivals more aggressive. This is a typical interaction in an oligopoly with strategic 
complements, andit appears true that a less egalitarian channel gets an advantage by letting rivals be more 
accommodating. The next proposition, however, shows the contrary. 
        as; P
roposition 3 > 0 ant ask < 0 for k ~ i i, e., a rise of egalitarianism in a channel raises its 
         Obi ab; 
market share anti reduces every other's. 
Proof. A change ofthe kth channel's share by a rise of egalitarianism n the ith channel isgiven by 
     ask . a 1 - -(1-bk(1- 1nk)) ax 
      ab; ab;1+(1-bk(1- ))•X - 1 
+ (1 - bk(l - 1 2 • ak <o,        /k                    / k)) X 
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where the last inequality comes from Proposition 2. Then it is a straightforward conclusion that the ith 
channel gets a larger share than before. Q.E.D.
      Our results suggest that a channel associated with higher egalitarian culture gets an advantage in 
competition and attains a larger market share. In the next section, we will try to relate these results to the 
case of the Japanese automobile market.
3. Distribution channels in the Japanese automobile market: Toyota and Nissan
3-1 Division of rewards in a distribution channel: The role of sales promotion funds 
      In the sale of automobiles, both advertising by makers and services by dealers have externalities to 
enhance consumers' favorable reactions and increase the total sales of a distribution channel. A dealer's 
effort to increase its sales also contributes to the sales of other dealers in the same channel, but the dealer 
does not consider this effect unless it results in personal gain. Hence, a channel needs some device for 
redistribution of the rewards to induce nough efforts from its members. It is difficult, however, to make 
and enforce a complete contract to prescribe the rewards for dealers'. efforts depending on all the factors 
affecting sales. In. a distribution channel for automobiles, therefore, the rewards are allotted through ex 
post provision of rebates and sales promotion funds by the maker.' On the manner of provision, we find 
some difference between Toyota and Nissan. In the Toyota channel, the amount of sales promotion funds 
for each dealer largely depends on the effort level monitored by the local inspector. In the Nissan channel, 
the sales plan made by the maker plays an influential role in determining how to divide the funds.' We 
' Shimokawa (1983) reports on the Japanese automobile market that an amount equal to 5% of the sales 
was paid as a rebate to dealers in the latter half of the 1970s. 
s In a survey made by one of the authors in 1991, dealers of Toyota's channel told him that he higher 
effort is rewarded by a higher amount of sales promotion funds even under bad market conditions, 
while Nissan's dealers aid the amount of the funds depends on. the sales plan of the maker as well as 
the effort made by the dealers. 
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conjecture that he difference comes from the channel cultures of Toyota and Nissan. Let us examine how 
the difference arises by reviewing.how these channels were constructed. 
3-2 Formation of marketing channels in the Japanese automobile industry 
      The history of construction of distribution channelsin the Japanese automobile industry began 
with those established by Japan Ford (1925) and Japan GM (1927). When Nissan (1934) and Toyota 
(1935) started the production of cars and trucks, they found it was urgently necessary to make their own 
distribution channels. Toyota managed this problem by headhunting such GM dealers as Hinode Motors 
(currently Aichi Toyota). This artifice was helped by the enactment of the Automobile Industry Act in 
1936, which aimed at exclude U.S. automobile makers from Japan's market. Also, it may have been 
helped by GM dealers' reliance on Shotaro Kamiya, who transferred from GM to Toyota in 1935. 
      When the distribution of automobiles was unified in 1942 as a part of wartime controls, Kamiya's 
ideas about marketing became known to dealers who had belonged to other channels than Toyota's. Since 
a key point in his ideas is attaching importance tothe dealers, many dealers began to agree with his way of 
thinking. Such agreement seems to be a reason why leading dealers in Nissan's prewar channel, people 
like Takesaburou Kikuchi, who had been the C.E.O. of the dealers' cooperative, transferred to Toyota's 
channel when wartime controls ended. Toyota thus came to possess ome strong dealers in its channel. 
Many of them had enough funds on hand to allow them to retain considerable independence. 
      After losing a lot of its dealers, Nissan had to reconstruct its channel.As many of the remaining 
dealers and newcomers did not have enough funds of their own, Nissan tried to support their growth. In 
several cases, however, it had to take over the outlets of slack dealers. So Nissan's distribution channel 
became a centralized one that included many outlets owned by the maker, while Toyota's became a 
decentralized one consisting of independent local companies. Even in the mid-1980s, most dealers in 
Toyota's distribution channel were local companies, whereas Nissan had more than half of a share in 90 
dealers of its channel which contains about 260 dealers. This difference ssentially remained until the 
1990s. 
      The above structural difference between the two channels effects a difference in their culture. A 
centralized channel like that of Nissan, where the maker often provides financial support for the dealers, 
produces aculture that does not attach importance toeach individual dealer. On the other hand, a Toyota-
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type channel, containing self-reliant dealers with their own funds, must be sensitive to the interests of 
individual dealers in order to keep them within the channel. This generates an egalitarian culture 
concerning itself with each dealer's welfare.
3-3 Market shares of Toyota and Nissan 
      The difference in sharing rules discussed in the previous ection is expected to make a difference 
in the market share of the two distribution channels. Actually, Table 1 shows that Toyota has attained a
larger market share than that of Nissan through the past 30 year, which suggests that this phenomenon. is 
caused by long-term factors." The difference could be partially explained by the differences in scale 
between the two channels, i.e., the numbers of dealers, sales tores, and workers within the channel. Table 
2 shows us that Toyota dominated Nissan in all of these categories inboth 1985 and 1996. But notice that 
the largest difference in these categories i  in the number of workers, and the ratio of the number of Nissan 
workers to that of Toyota workers was 70.5 % (57.0) in 1985 (1996). In the same year, the ratio of 
Nissan's market share to Toyota's was only 62.2 % (52.1). So difference in scale would not be enough to 
explain the whole difference in market share. We can see that he remainder can be explained by the effort 
level of the dealers and their workers. Each salesman i Toyota's channel sold 43.3 (17.2) cars on average, 
while each Nissan salesman sold 38.8 (15.7) cars in 1985 (1996). These data can be interpreted tomean 
that a dealer in Toyota's channel puts out more effort han one in Nissan's channel. 
      As we have argued in the last subsection, Toyota's channel contains many independent dealers and 
seems to have a culture that treats the interest of each dealer seriously. On the other hand, Nissan's 
channel, in which many dealers are outlets of the manufacturer, seems to have a centralized culture that 
treats individual dealers lightly. We can see that these two distribution channels have different values of 
the parameter a;in our model. That is, the Toyota channel has a higher value of a; than the Nissan channel 
 In 1960, when Nissan put its Bluebird on sale, it sold more passenger cars (48,130) than Toyota did 
(38,922). Even in that year, however, Toyota's total sales( including business cars, therefore) was 
127,153 cars, which was larger than Nissan's total sales (103,490). 
10 Itami (1990, Ch.5) argues that he lower share of Nissan is caused by failures in product policies. 
But it is difficult o explain why the failures have been repeated for such a long time. 
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does. So our model predicts that the dealers of Toyota's channel provide more effort and attain higher 
market share than Nissan's dealers do, a result hat is supported by the above data." 
4. Conclusions 
      In this paper we consider the culture of an organization as a value judgement shared by its 
members. Keeping distribution channels in mind, we analyze a model of competing organizations with 
different value judgements and show how such a difference results in different sharing rules and different 
performance. Comparative statics of the model provides clues to understand the performance of two 
distribution channels of Japan's major automobile makers, Toyota and Nissan. Toyota's distribution 
channel was constructed byabsorbing existing dealers, and as a result, has generated an egalitarian culture 
to deal with its relatively independent dealers. Such a culture makes the sharing rule of the rewards more 
sensitive to the observed efforts of each dealer, and derives high efforts from dealers. This effect works to 
the channel's advantage in the competition for market share. On the other hands, containing many outlets 
possessed by the maker, Nissan's distribution channel generates a more "centralized" culture that treats 
individual dealers lightly. As our model suggests, holding other conditions constant, such a channel loses 
its market share in the competition with more egalitarian channels. Thus the egalitarian culture of 
Toyota's channel is a factor that explains why it has attained a larger market share than Nissan's channel. 
      In the Japanese automobile market, a consumer is inclined to repeat purchases fromthe same 
maker. This means that a larger market share actually brings higher profits in the long run, and rewards 
for a channel do indeed. increase with its market share. Actually, Toyota's distribution channel has local 
inspectors who monitor the effort levels of the dealers, and their reports are reflected in the provision of 
sales promotion funds to each dealer. This system is a device to keep the reputation for egalitarianism in 
the channel, and such efforts are compensated forby the advantage of keeping alarge market share.
" Shimokawa (1990) summarizes his observation as "the channel containing more outlets owned by 
the maker shows poorer sales and management." 
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      Finally, let us emphasize that our arguments assume competing organizations. As we have noted 
in the introduction, the main message of the paper is that the degree of egalitarianism can be an important 
criterion for classifying corporate cultures because it suggests good performance by an organization in 
competition. Many researches on. corporate culture are not so careful about the strategic interaction of 
competing organizations and concentrate on the role of the culture inside an organization. As a profit-
making organization faces such a large amount of rivalry, the desirable characters of the culture should be 
argued by taking that rivalry into consideration. If we want to insist that organizations should generate the 
most advantageous cultures for their organizations, the accounts of existing cultures should also mention 
how rivalry affects the growth of a particular organization. This paper is possibly a first step to future 
research.
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